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ESSAY
STONE v. RITTER AND THE EXPANDING
DUTY OF LOYALTY
ClaireA. Hill* & Brett H. McDonnell**
Stone v. Ritter is the first post-Disney Delaware Supreme Court case
articulatingthe doctrine of good faith. Taking Stone v. Ritter as a point of
departure, we propose a way of understanding how good faith fits within
the broader context of Delaware fiduciary duty cases. We see potential
cases as arrayed along a continuum from traditional care cases to
traditional loyalty cases. In between are cases where director or officer
objectivity is impaired, but less so than in traditional loyalty cases. The
emerging law of goodfaith helps courts deal with such cases. Particular
clusters of cases develop detailed guidance for certain recurring
problematicsituations-theadoption of takeover defenses, board responses
to shareholder derivative suits, the approval of executive compensation,
and so on. At the same time, a more general doctrine of good faith is
emerging, one that provides an expressive handle on which to ground
future holdings and encouragethe development of appropriatenorms.
INTRODUCTION

After the latest Disney decision, good faith had been poised to take on a
new and prominent role in Delaware corporate law. Whether good faith
would be treated as an independent duty or as a component of one of the
traditional fiduciary duties-loyalty or care-was, however, not clear. In
the next case to arise, Stone v. Ritter,1 the Delaware Supreme Court quite
specifically characterized the duty of good faith as part of the duty of
loyalty. The court also threw in a bit of a shocker in Stone, characterizing
In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,2 until then a
paradigmatic duty of care case, as a duty of loyalty case. 3 How can we
understand what happened? What now becomes of good faith and the duty

* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.

** Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. We are grateful for the helpful

comments we received at a square-table presentation at the University of Minnesota and at
the Canadian Law and Economics Association conference.
1. 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
2. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
3. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
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of care? And, most importantly, how do we understand directors' standards
of conduct? When will directors be liable, and when will they not? More
specifically, when will section 102(b)(7) 4 exculpation be available?
In this Essay, we argue that the court in Stone got it right and, indeed,
should have gone further. Stone recasts Caremark-type "care" as a species
of the duty of loyalty; however, we think the duty of care in toto, including
both Caremark-type care and the more generic inattention-type care, is
properly understood as largely subsumed by the duty of loyalty. Stone
opens the door to a more analytically satisfactory articulation of the
standard of liability for breach of fiduciary duty. It provides the analytic
underpinnings for a continuum of liability where the vast middle ground is
good faith, understood as a component of the duty of loyalty.
In this Essay, we propose a way of understanding how good faith fits
within the broader context of Delaware fiduciary duty cases. We see
potential cases as arrayed along a continuum. At one end are traditional
care cases, cases that raise no concern about the objectivity of directors and
officers; at the other end are traditional loyalty cases, cases in which the
objectivity of directors and officers is clearly impaired and their ability to
profit at the corporation's expense is significant. In traditional care cases,
the only conflict between directors and the corporation arises from the
natural human tendency not to work as hard or carefully as one might when
one is not reaping all the fruits of one's labors. In the traditional loyalty
cases, a decision maker has a material pecuniary interest that directly
conflicts with that of the corporation-for instance, where a director or
officer is selling land to the corporation. In between are cases where
director or officer objectivity is impaired, but less so than in traditional
loyalty cases. The emerging law of good faith helps courts deal with such
cases. We suggest that this law is developing at two levels of abstraction.
Particular clusters of cases develop detailed guidance for certain recurring
problematic situations-the adoption of takeover defenses, board responses
to shareholder derivative suits, the approval of executive compensation, and
so on. At the same time, a more general doctrine of good faith is emerging
that helps courts deal with more unique circumstances or with emerging
problematic business practices; the more general doctrine provides an
expressive handle on which to ground future holdings and encourage the
development of appropriate norms. The law thus provides guidance,
structured and unstructured, as well as flexibility.
This Essay proceeds as follows: In Part I, we discuss the doctrinal
background leading up to Stone, setting the stage for good faith to assume a
prominent role. In Part II, we discuss Stone. In Part III, we set forth our
view of what fiduciary duty really consists; we show how present duty of
care and loyalty cases, and emerging case law on good faith, fit into one
continuum. In Part IV, we develop a proposal making use of our continuum

4. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
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and our previous work on structural bias, distinguishing stylized classes of
cases and establishing procedures for each; we discuss how different types
of cases would come out under our proposal.
I. DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND

The doctrine of good faith in Delaware corporate law followed a rather
twisted path on its way to Stone v. Ritter. We do not chart that path in
detail here. Rather, we highlight some of the main turns and milestones
along the way. One could go back further, but we start with the state of
Delaware doctrine in the early eighties.
Classically, courts and commentators have identified two types of
fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors: the duty of loyalty and
the duty of care. The duty of loyalty applies where managers engage in
interested transactions with the corporation. 5 If there is no conflict of
interest, then the duty of care applies and defendants receive the protection
of the business judgment rule. This two-part understanding of fiduciary
duty is enshrined in corporate law casebooks. 6 The Model Business
Principles of Corporate
Corporation Act and the American Law Institute
7
Governance both codified this understanding.
By the mid-eighties, the classical division between loyalty and care had
already been complicated by the introduction of several new standards of
care. The Unocal standard applied where a board adopted measures to
defend against a hostile takeover. 8 The Revlon standard applied where a
board had put its corporation up for sale. 9 The Zapata standard applied
where a board had appointed a special litigation committee to review the
facts in a pending shareholder derivative lawsuit and the committee had
recommended dismissing the suit. 10 We shall include these special
standards in our story below. However, those standards apply to limited,
For most sorts of corporate
albeit important, factual circumstances.
decisions, and cases resulting from them, the basic division into loyalty and
care still hold.

5. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) ("A director is considered
interested where he or she will receive a personal financial benefit from a transaction that is

not equally shared by the stockholders. Directorial interest also exists where a corporate

decision will have a materially detrimental impact on a director, but not on the corporation
and the shareholders." (citations omitted)).
6. See Jesse H. Choper et al., Cases and Materials on Corporations 74-179 (6th ed.
2004); William A. Klein et al., Business Association: Cases and Materials on Agency,
Partnerships and Corporations 328-412 (6th ed. 2006); D. Gordon Smith & Cynthia A.
Williams, Business Organization: Cases, Problems, and Case Studies 395-524 (2004).
7. See Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations pt. IV
(duty of care), pt. V (duty of loyalty) (1994); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8(C), (F) (2005).
8. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
9. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
10. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981).
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So how did good faith come into the picture? There are a variety of
sources, but let us focus on one judicial doctrine and one statute.11 The
doctrine is the business judgment rule. This rule shields corporate
managers from judicial scrutiny of their decisions. It does not apply if the
plaintiffs can demonstrate that the transaction in question involved a
conflict of interest. If the plaintiffs cannot do so, the business judgment
presumption comes into play. According to the canonical formulation of
the business judgment rule as it took form by the early eighties, it is "a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 12honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."'
This formulation of the business judgment rule provides three ways in
which a plaintiff may attempt to rebut the presumption: by showing that the
directors either did not act on an informed basis, did not act in good faith, or
did not have an honest belief that the action they took was in the best
interests of the company. Following the Smith v. Van Gorkom 13 decision,
most attention focused on the informed basis prong. The duty of care came
adequate
to be seen as focused on whether the directors had followed
14
decision.
a
making
before
themselves
procedures in informing
However, good faith lay dormant within that formulation, and eventually
became more important after the legislative response to Van Gorkom.
Responding to concerns of rampant director liability and a consequent crisis
in Directors' and Officers' (D&O) liability insurance, the Delaware
legislature added section 102(b)(7) to the state's corporate law. This
section allows corporations to put provisions in their certificates of
incorporation that waive personal liability of directors for violations of
fiduciary duty. 15 However, liability for several types of fiduciary duty

11. Several other statutory provisions, beyond that discussed in the text, are notable for
their use of the good faith concept as well. These include Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(e)
(2001) (good faith reliance on records and opinions), Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (good faith
board or shareholder approval of interested transactions), and Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145
(indemnification allowed for liability incurred as a result of actions in good faith, thus
apparently disallowing indemnification for liability incurred as a result of actions lacking
good faith).
12. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
13. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
14. In this regard, Van Gorkom has been disparaged as encouraging directors to
formalistically follow and document "due procedure," without regard to, and perhaps at the
expense of, critical and rigorous decision making. On Delaware corporate law's emphasis
on process, see Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 Wash. U.
L. Rev. 1717, 1789-90 (2006).
15. Section 102(b)(7) quickly became part of the story told by the many corporate law
scholars who thought director liability had no teeth-as some said, an outside director has
more chance of being hit by lightning than being found liable for breaching his fiduciary
duty. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside DirectorLiability, 58
Stan. L. Rev. 1055, 1139-40 (2006); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1735, 1791 (2001). Interestingly, Delaware Chancellor Leo Strine and Professor Lynn Stout
now think directors are too responsive to pressures from public shareholders, and that firms
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violations cannot be waived. Duty of loyalty violations, for example, may
not be waived. 16 Crucially, neither may decisions that are not in good
faith. 17
Notice, then, the incentives created for plaintiffs' lawyers by this
combination of the business judgment rule and section 102(b)(7). If
plaintiffs' lawyers cannot succeed in pleading that a conflict of interest
existed, their next best strategy is to plead that the board did not act in good
faith. If they can succeed in this argument, two positive consequences
follow. First, the defendants lose the protection of the business judgment
rule. Second, the defendants will not be able to use section 102(b)(7) to
avoid personal liability.
Plaintiffs' lawyers are not stupid, nor are they immune to the effect of
incentives. Although it may have taken longer than one might have
expected, ultimately the predictable happened: plaintiffs' lawyers started to
include arguments that defendant directors had not acted in good faith. This
has gradually forced the Delaware courts to begin to consider how to handle
such claims.
Case law on good faith grew slowly, though. Moreover, a tension
developed in the cases between the Delaware Supreme Court and Chancery
Court. 18 In the nineties, Delaware Supreme Court cases started referring to
a triad of fiduciary duties: loyalty, care, and good faith. 19 For instance, in
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. it said,
To rebut the [business judgment] rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the
burden of providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged
decision, breached any one
of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good
20
faith, loyalty or due care.

However, these cases just referred to good faith; the decisions were not
based on that duty, and hence the cases gave no guidance as to what the
duty might entail.
The Delaware Chancery Court rather insolently resisted the triad notion.
21
Instead, it located good faith within the duty of loyalty in several cases.

are therefore increasingly going private. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and
Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More
Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. Corp. L. 1 (2007); Lynn Stout, Investors
Who Are Too Bolshyfor Their Own Good, Fin. Times, Apr. 23, 2007, at 9.

16. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i).
17. See id. § 102(b)(7)(ii).
18. See Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of
DirectorLiabilityin CorporateLaw, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1131, 1155 (2006).

19. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Del. 1999); Malone v.
Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361
(Del. 1993).
20. Cede, 634 A.2d at 361.
21. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003); Nagy v. Bistricer, 770
A.2d 43, 48 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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A director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in
the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation's best interest.
For this reason, the same case that invented the so-called 'triad[]' of
fiduciary duty also defined good faith as loyalty.
It does no service to our law's clarity to continue to separate the duty
of loyalty from its own essence; nor does the recognition that good faith is
essential to loyalty demean or subordinate that essential requirement.
There might be situations when a director acts in subjective good faith and
is yet not loyal (e.g., if the director is interested in a transaction subject to
the entire fairness standard and cannot prove financial fairness), but there
is no case in which a director can act in subjective bad faith towards the
corporation and act loyally.
The reason for the disloyalty (the
faithlessness) is irrelevant, the underlying motive (be it venal, familial,
collegial, or nihilistic) for conscious action not in the corporation's
best
22
interest does not make it faithful, as opposed to faithless.

However, even these cases gave little guidance as to what good faith entails.
In the meantime, several cases interpreting the process by which a
defendant may invoke section 102(b)(7) confirmed the importance of
determining when plaintiffs have successfully pleaded a lack of good faith.
Emerald Partners v. Berlin held that section 102(b)(7) "is in the nature of
an affirmative defense."' 23 Malpiede v. Townson2 4 clarified this point. If
plaintiffs can succeed in adequately pleading either a loyalty violation or
bad faith, then the case cannot be dismissed on the pleadings through
invoking section 102(b)(7). If the case survives the pleading stage, then
25
defendants attempting to invoke section 102(b)(7) must prove good faith.
Thus, since most Delaware corporations have exculpation clauses in their
certificates, whether or not a pleading can survive a motion to dismiss may
frequently depend on whether the plaintiffs have adequately pled a lack of
good faith.
What, then, do the Delaware courts mean when they refer to action not
taken in good faith? 26 The most in-depth answer to that question thus far

22. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34 (citations omitted).
23. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223 (Del. 1999).
24. 780 A.2d 1075, 1092-96 (Del. 2001).
25. See supra note 11.
26. In recent years a number of scholars have written articles considering the meaning
and implications of Delaware's growing good faith jurisprudence. In addition to the sources
cited elsewhere in this Essay, these include Robert Baker, In re Walt Disney: What It Means
to the Definition of Good Faith, Exculpatory Clauses, and the Nature of Executive
Compensation, 4 Fla. St. U. Bus. Rev. 261 (2005); Matthew R. Berry, Does Delaware's
Section 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless Directorsfrom Personal Liability? Only If Delaware
Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 1125 (2004); Carter G. Bishop, A Good Faith
Revival of Duty of Care Liability in Business Organization Law, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 479
(2006); Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate
Directors: The Disney Standardand the "New" Good Faith, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 211 (2006);
Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct: Are Delaware
Courts Ready to Force Corporate Directors to Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney IV?, 83
Denv. U. L. Rev. 531 (2005); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of
Rhetoric in CorporateLaw Jurisprudence,55 Duke L.J. 1 (2005); Sean J. Griffith & Myron
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comes from the Disney cases. The key formulation in the Disney cases is as
follows: "[T]he concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious
disregardfor one's responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the
only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good

faith."'27 In a more detailed elaboration, the court said,

A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the
fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the
best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to
violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails
to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
bad faith yet to
disregard for his duties. There may be other examples of
28
be proven or alleged, but these three are the most salient.

The courts, both chancery and supreme, applied this standard to the facts
surrounding the hiring, and then the firing, of Michael Ovitz as second-incommand at Disney, and found that the board's conduct was in good faith
(or at least, that the plaintiffs had not succeeded in showing that the
directors had acted in bad faith). 29 The conduct was fairly close to the edge
under this standard insofar as the Chancery Court held that the pleadings
30
were suggestive enough of bad faith to withstand a motion to dismiss.
The case thereby gives us a general, although rather vague, formulation for
good faith, and one, albeit important, data point in deciphering how to apply
that vague formulation to a complicated fact pattern.
31
The most direct precedent in the cases leading up to Stone is Caremark.
Simply put, Caremark employees violated federal and state laws, with the
32
result that Caremark had to pay $250 million in fines and reimbursements. 33
The board neither knew of nor approved the employees' conduct.

T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 Bus. Law. 1
(2005); Janet E. Kerr, Developments in CorporateGovernance: The Duty of Good Faith and
Its Impact on DirectorConduct, 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1037 (2006); John L. Reed & Matt
Neiderman, "Good Faith" and the Ability of Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware
Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and
Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 Del. J. Corp. L. 111 (2004); David Rosenberg,
Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian
Approach, 29 Del. J. Corp. L. 491 (2004); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89
Cornell L. Rev. 456 (2004); C.G. Hintmann, Note, You Gotta Have Faith: Good Faith in the
Context of DirectorialFiduciary Duties and the FutureImpact on Corporate Culture, 49 St.
Louis U. L.J. 571 (2005); Filippo Rossi, Making Sense of the Delaware Supreme Court's
Triad of Fiduciary Duties (June 22, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-755784.
27. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 62 (Del. 2006) (quoting the
Chancery Court opinion).
28. Id. at 67 (quoting the Chancery Court opinion).
29. Id. at 72. We consider in the text accompanying note 109, infra, whether 'not in
good faith' and 'bad faith' are, or should be, equivalent.
30. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
31. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
32. Id. at 960-61.
33. Id. at 965 ("No senior officers or directors were charged with wrongdoing in the
Government Settlement Agreement or in any of the prior indictments.... [Tihe United
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Shareholders sued, alleging that, by failing to adequately monitor employee
behavior, the directors violated their fiduciary duty. 34 Chancellor William
Allen labeled Caremarkas a case alleging a breach of the "duty of attention
or care in connection with the on-going operation of the corporation's
business." 3 5 He divided cases involving the "duty to exercise appropriate
attention" into two classes. 36 The first class concerns liability that "may be
said to follow from a board decision that results in a loss because that
decision was ill advised or 'negligent."' 37 This would seem to be the
standard duty of care case, epitomized by Van Gorkom.
The second kind of failure to exercise appropriate attention case
"entail[s] circumstances in which a loss eventuates not from a decision but,
from unconsidered inaction." 38 Caremark is such a case. These cases raise
the question as to whether boards have a duty to install some sort of
monitoring system that may catch corporate wrongdoing. Chancellor Allen
argued that there is such a duty in contemporary business culture:
Can it be said today that, absent some ground giving rise to suspicion of
violation of law, that corporate directors have no duty to assure that a
corporate information gathering and reporting system exists which
represents a good faith attempt to provide senior management and the
Board with information respecting material acts, events or conditions
within the corporation, including compliance
with applicable statutes and
39
regulations? I certainly do not believe so.
However, only the most egregious of circumstances will violate this duty:
"[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists-will establish the lack of good
'40
faith that is a necessary condition to liability.
So what sort of fiduciary duty does Caremark represent?
The
conventional answer has been that it arises under the duty of care. After all,
it involved no self-dealing or conflict of interest, the standard hallmarks of
the duty of loyalty. Moreover, the question in the case is whether or not the
board paid adequate attention to company affairs, the classic duty of care
question. Corporate law casebooks include this case in the chapter on the
duty of care-including Chancellor Allen's own casebook. 41

States stipulated that no senior executive of Caremark participatedin, condoned, or was
willfully ignorantof the wrongdoing .

.

34. Id. at 964.
35. Id. at 967.

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 968.
39. Id. at 969 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
41. William T. Allen, Reinier Kraakman & Guhan Subramanian, Commentaries and
Cases on the Law of Business Organization 282-92 (2d ed. 2007).
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But consider the highlighted language above referring to good faith.
Good faith language appears elsewhere in the opinion as well. 42 If good
faith did represent a separate duty from care, there would be a decent
textual basis for characterizing Caremark as a good faith case and not as a
care case at all. Thus, before Stone, there was some question as to whether
the Caremarkduty should be classified under the duty of care or the duty of
good faith. Stone answers the categorization question. It turns out, though,
that the answer is actually door number three: the duty of loyalty.
II.

STONE v. RITTER

43
As the Chancery Court said, Stone was "'a classic Caremark claim."'
Employees at AmSouth Bancorporation failed to file suspicious activity
reports, as required by banking law. 44 These failures led to fines and civil
penalties, and the banking regulators found that AmSouth's legal
compliance program was inadequate. 4 5 Shareholders brought a derivative
suit against the board claiming that it had violated its fiduciary duty 46by
failing to institute an adequate program for monitoring legal compliance.
The outcome in the case was not surprising: the Delaware Chancery
Court dismissed the claim, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.
Caremark duties are deliberately structured to make it extremely hard for
plaintiffs to win. Of slightly more interest, the Delaware Supreme Court
explicitly upheld the Caremark standard. 47 That is notable, but not a
surprise. It confirms what most observers expected.
What did surprise many observers 48 was the Delaware Supreme Court's
discussion of where Caremark duties fit analytically within the general
structure of fiduciary duty law. The placement matters because AmSouth

42. E.g., Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 ("[Clompliance with a director's duty of care can
never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board
decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or
rationality of the process employed." (emphasis omitted)); id. at 968 ("Indeed, one wonders
on what moral basis might shareholders attack a good faith business decision of a director as
,unreasonable' or 'irrational.' Where a director in fact exercises a good faith effort to be
informed and to exercise appropriate judgment, he or she should be deemed to satisfy fully
the duty of attention." (emphasis omitted)); id. ("Learned Hand correctly identifies the core
element of any corporate law duty of care inquiry: whether there was good faith effort to be
informed and exercise judgment."); id. at 970 ("[A] director's obligation includes a duty to
attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the
board concludes is adequate, exists ....").
43. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006) (quoting the Chancery Court

opinion).
44. Id. at
45. Id. at
46. Id. at
47. Id. at
48. See,

365.
365-66.
364.
365, 369.
e.g.,

BusinessAssociationsBlog,

http://www.businessassociationsblog.com/lawandbusiness/comments/stone

v-ritterdirector

s_caremark-oversight.duties/ (Jan. 3, 2007); Posting of Gordon Smith to Conglomerate,

http://www.theconglomerate.org/2007/01/goodfaithcare.html (Jan. 3, 2007).
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had an exculpation clause. Since there was no plausible self-dealing claim,
if Caremark claims were to fall under the duty of care rubric, then under
Emerald Partnersand Malpiede simple invocation of the exculpation clause
would lead to immediate dismissal. 49 However, if a Caremark claim does
not fall under the care rubric, then the court must consider whether
plaintiffs have adequately pled facts which support a Caremark claim, and
not dismiss if they have succeeded in doing so.
The Delaware Supreme Court goes on to closely analyze the reasoning of
Caremark. It points to the Chancery Court's repeated reliance on the
concept of good faith, in the language quoted above and elsewhere. It thus
seems to categorize Caremark as a good faith case. But then the Delaware
Supreme Court pushes a step further:
It is important, in this context, to clarify a doctrinal issue that is critical
to understanding fiduciary liability under Caremark as we construe that
case. The phraseology used in Caremark and that we employ heredescribing the lack of good faith as a "necessary condition to liability"is deliberate. The purpose of that formulation is to communicate that a
failure to act in good faith is not conduct that results, ipso facto, in the
direct imposition of fiduciary liability. The failure to act in good faith
may result in liability because the requirement to act in good faith "is a
subsidiary element[,]" i.e., a condition, "of the fundamental duty of
loyalty." It follows that because a showing of bad faith conduct, in the
sense described in Disney and Caremark,is essential to establish director
oversight liability,
the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty
50
of loyalty.
Thus, in this paragraph, what had been generally understood to be an
instance of the duty of care, indeed perhaps the leading operative instance
of the duty of care, became officially an instance of the duty of loyalty.
The court goes on to articulate two doctrinal consequences of this
formulation. First, despite being described "colloquially" (by the Delaware
Supreme Court, that oh-so-colloquial body), as one of a "triad, '5 1 good
faith is not an independent fiduciary duty. Only loyalty and care can result
in direct liability, while'failure to act in good faith only indirectly results in
liability. The second consequence is the widening of the duty of loyalty.
No longer is loyalty only about "financial or other cognizable fiduciary
conflict of interest."' 52 It also includes good faith. As the court puts it,
quoting one of the Chancery Court cases that had so insolently, but in the
end triumphantly, disputed the Delaware Supreme Court's triad, "'A
director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the
good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation's best interest.' ' 53

49. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
50. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70.

51. Id. at 370.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
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What does this all mean as a matter of doctrine? As a matter of the
English language? As a practical matter for those subject to Delaware law?
Those are the questions to which we now turn.

III. Is THERE ONLY ONE FIDUCIARY DUTY?
As we argued in an earlier paper, we think the duty of care was always
fundamentally a duty of loyalty:
Ultimately, directors and officers owe only one fiduciary duty to a
corporation-the duty to actively pursue the best interests of the
corporation. The duties of loyalty, care, and good faith address differing
aspects of this duty.... The traditional duty of loyalty addresses

situations where directors or officers have material conflicts of interest
that are likely to tempt them to favor their own interests over those of the
corporation. The duty of care addresses the natural human tendency of
directors and officers to not actively exert themselves in pursuing the
interests of others. However, on some profound level, it, too, is a breach
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, although the courts do not consider it
and officers are taking leisure that they are not entitled
such-directors
to. 54
There was, and remains, a need to distinguish different sorts of cases to
establish different procedural requirements and burdens of proof and
persuasion. But those distinctions, important as they may be, do not take
away from the critical feature these breaches share: that the directors and
officers are taking for themselves something that belongs to the corporation.
The classic duty of loyalty cases involve directors or officers taking for
themselves in a very tangible (or at least straightforward) way what should
otherwise belong to the corporations-say, a profit from a sale of an asset
to the director at a below-market price or from a business opportunity
offered to the corporation. What is critical to note, though, is that the
corporation is as entitled to the director and officer's time and careful
attention as it is to the full profit from the sale of its assets. What it means
to be a fiduciary is to "act for the benefit of another person on all matters
within the scope of their relationship." 55 The conduct at issue in breaches
of loyalty or care (or, as we discuss below, the emerging duty of good faith)

54. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith & Structural Bias, 32 J.

Corp. L. 833, 855 (2007).
55. Black's Law Dictionary 658 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "fiduciary" as "[a] person who
is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the scope of their
relationship; one who owes to another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and
candor"). The doctrine comes from agency law. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01
cmt. e (2006). This doctrine has been put to use not only in corporate law, but in many other
areas as well, most notably in trust law. Some legal relationships are considered fiduciary
relationships and are governed by some general common law doctrines that essentially
reflect the Black's Law Dictionary's definition. See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciar
Duties, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 127 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998).
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is not only not "for the benefit of' the officer or director's principal, but it is
also at the principal's expense.
Where does the duty of good faith fit in? In our view, the classic
formulations of the duty of loyalty were much too limited. A broader
formulation was needed to capture conduct that fell outside those bounds
but was more than simply generic inattention, for which the highly
deferential business judgment standard was used. One can see how, from
an analytic distance, making a qualitative distinction between, as one of us
says in class when explaining the two duties, snoozing and stealing makes
sense. Inattention (snoozing) seems less morally culpable. However, when
we consider precisely why a director would be snoozing or otherwise be
less than appropriately diligent, we find that in most cases there is
something rather more culpable going on, something well captured by the
concept of lack of good faith. Indeed, in this regard, consider that generic
inattention-simply not looking hard enough or well enough, without a
suspect motive-was very rarely what was at issue in the classic duty of
care cases. 56 An excellent example is Van Gorkom,57 (the duty of care case
that prompted the legislature to enact section 102(b)(7)), in which the facts
strongly implicated excessive deference by the officers and directors to the
chief executive officer (CEO).
The duty of good faith thus offers a conceptual framework, under the
broader rubric of the duty of loyalty, to encompass cases of culpable
conduct not constituting breaches of the duty of loyalty as traditionally
conceived.58 At present, the cases roughly fit into three general categories;
other categories may, however, emerge as the jurisprudence develops.
One category is the familiar one of "structural bias"-roughly, again,
excessive deference to the other directors or officers. A second category
involves cases where director or officer self-interest may be present but the
actions at issue involve core corporate concerns, and hence are
appropriately not scrutinized to the same extent as cases implicating the
traditional duty of loyalty. As we noted in Disney, Good Faith & Structural
Bias,59 courts might reasonably want to discourage classically (and often
predominantly) self-interested activities such as hiring one's relatives or
having business dealings for one's personal account with a corporation of
which one is CEO. But the types of conduct in the class of cases we are
concerned with here cannot feasibly be discouraged altogether: directors
need, for instance, to consider their responses to takeovers notwithstanding
the fact that they may be motivated (in part?) by a desire to entrench
themselves in office. For present purposes, we call such cases "suspect

56. And of course, after the Delaware legislature enacted section 102(b)(7), allegations

that simply amounted to generic inattention became rarer still.
57. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
58. For an argument that loyalty should be broadly conceived to include an element of
affirmative devotion to the well-being of the corporation, see Lyman Johnson, After Enron:
Remembering Loyalty Discourse in CorporateLaw, 28 Del. J. Corp. L. 27 (2003).
59. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 54, at 852.
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motive" cases. The third category, "conduct involving illegality," consists
of either insufficient monitoring for illegal acts or actually engaging in such
acts.
Structural bias is the obvious and paradigmatic category within our
framework; it may involve problematic behavior, yet falls short of the
traditional duty of loyalty violation. 60 Consider in this regard the fact
pattern alleged in Brehm v. Eisner: hasty accession to the CEO's wishes as
to hiring and compensating a crony (including as to the crony's termination
package and the crony's entitlement thereto). 6 1 There clearly was no
violation of the duty of loyalty as traditionally conceived. Still, the
behavior alleged to have occurred violated what the duty of loyalty properly
ought to encompass: a duty to critically consider important corporate
decisions and not simply rubber-stamp whatever the CEO proposes.
Consider also a decision by a board to backdate officers' stock options.
In a recent backdating case, Ryan v. Gifford,62 the court characterized as
"conduct that is disloyal to the corporation and is therefore an act in bad
faith" 63 the "intentional violation of a shareholder approved stock option
plan, coupled with fraudulent disclosures regarding the directors' purported
compliance with that plan." 64 What motivates the other directors to
approve such a plan and make such fraudulent disclosures is presumably
structural bias. Consider as well a board or committee's decision not to
board
pursue, or to terminate, a shareholder derivative suit (involving
65
members not involved in the decision), as happened in Zapata.
In the paradigmatic structural bias situation, the director is directly
furthering the interests of other directors or officers, when those interests
may not be those of the corporation or its shareholders. He is furthering his
own interests as well, albeit less directly: He presumably increases the
chance he stays on the board or gets some perk (a donation by the company
to his favored charity?). 66He also promotes and perpetuates as a norm the
"pernicious golden rule," perhaps building up some claim on reciprocal
67
good treatment in his own capacity as an officer.
There are other situations where the self-interest is more direct, but those
situations still do not come under a traditional duty of loyalty analysis. This
is the category we call "suspect motives." A board's reaction to takeovers
provides an example. 68 Entrenchment, or at least a generous severance
60. See Julian Velasco, StructuralBias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 Wash.
U. L.Q. 821 (2004).
61. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
62. 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007).
63. Id. at 358.
64. Id.
65. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981).
66. We coined this term to describe directors who are also officers of other corporations
who defer in their capacities as directors because, as officers, they would want a deferential
board. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 54, at 838.
67. For more on structural bias, see Velasco, supra note 60.
68. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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package, is always a possible motive. However, there can be other selfserving motives. Consider Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & ForbesHoldings,
Inc.69 To defend itself against a hostile takeover by a suitor the board did
not like, a defense perhaps motivated, at least in part, by one self-serving
motive-entrenchment-Revlon had issued notes to many of its
shareholders in exchange for their shares. 70 The corporation's investment
bank opined that the notes would trade at their face value; for this to
continue to be true, the covenants contained in the notes had to be in
effect. 7 1 But Revlon waived the covenants in order to attract a bidder they
The notes therefore fell in value and
preferred: Forstmann Little.
Forstmann then promised to support the value of the notes. 72 The directors
claimed that favoring Forstmann because Forstmann made this promise
constituted good faith: the board was entitled to consider the interests of
constituencies other than the shareholders, including the noteholders. 73 The
court agreed with the board in principle, but held that there needed to be
"rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders" 74 -which, in this
case, there were not. The court clearly thought that the board was not
taking into account the interests of the noteholders so much as its own
interests in not being sued by the noteholders. It noted that "the fiduciary
standards outlined in Unocal... impose an enhanced duty to abjure any
action that is motivated by considerations other than a good faith concern"
for the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 75 It held that
"the Revlon board could not make the requisite showing of good faith by
preferring the noteholders and ignoring its duty of loyalty to the
76
shareholders."
A line of case law sets forth a duty of candor and disclosure owed by the
directors and officers. 77 Where does this duty fit into our analysis? The
duty paradigmatically arises when directors and officers need shareholder
consent, and obtain such consent using disclosures that are false or
incomplete. It arises as well when the directors and officers make other
false or incomplete disclosures, notwithstanding that they were not doing so
to obtain consent. 78

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
Id. at 177-79, 182-83.
Id.at 177.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 182.

77. See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Callingoff the Lynch Mob: The Corporate

Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1087 (1996) (discussing the duty
generally).
78. See id. at 1146 (discussing another type of case, in which a director is acquiring
stock from an outside, public stockholder). We do not discuss this type of case because no
action even purportedly on behalf of the corporation is involved.
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In In re Tyson Foods, Inc. ConsolidatedShareholder Litigation,79 a case
involving options "spring loading" (options grants made immediately prior
to the announcement of good news), the court noted that
[d]isclosure violations may, but do not always, involve violations of the
duty of loyalty. A decision violates only the duty of care when the
misstatement or omission was made as a result of a director's erroneous
judgment with regard to the proper scope and content of disclosure, but
was nevertheless made in good faith. Conversely, where there is reason
to believe that the board lacked good faith
in approving a disclosure, the
80
violation implicates the duty of loyalty.

One can easily imagine some breaches of the duty of disclosure as being
encompassed within the traditional duty of loyalty. Imagine the CEO lying
and saying he bought for his personal use at $X property of the corporation
worth $X when he knows the true valuation of the property is lOX. But
more often, it is not the traditional duty of loyalty but rather structural bias
or suspect motives that will be implicated. Consider directors depicting a
decision that was a foregone conclusion-rejecting a takeover offer or
offering a not-for-cause termination to a crony, for instance-as being
extensively and critically considered. Or directors taking a problematic
action, such as backdating options or paying a higher severance package
than agreed upon to the shareholders, and either not disclosing it or perhaps
even falsely depicting the action as appropriate or compliant. 8 1

79. 919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007).
80. Id. at 597-98.
8 1. One interesting recent case involves the severance payment made to Carly Fiorina,
former chief executive officer, when she left Hewlett Packard (HP). In Indiana Elec.
Workers Pension Trust Fund, IBEW v. Dunn, HP was sued by shareholders who claimed that
Fiorina's severance payment was more than the 2.99-times-salary-and-bonus threshold
above which HP's severance policy stated HP would seek shareholder approval. No. C-0601711 RMW, 2007 WL 1223220 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2007). One claim made by the
shareholders rested on the duty of disclosure-that "defendants breached their fiduciary duty
to disclose because HP did not disclose in its 2004, 2005, and 2006 proxy statements that it
never intended to honor the Severance Policy or provisions of the Severance Program."
Indiana Elec. Id. at * 11. The case was dismissed, but the plaintiffs were granted leave to
amend their pleadings, and they have done so. Id. at * 12.
Shareholders have also brought suits criticizing corporate disclosure alleging that the
action at issue was disclosed but not properly characterized-paradigmatically, that directors
took some questionable action and did not characterize it as such. Courts have rejected those
sorts of claims, saying boards do not have to engage in self-flagellation. See, e.g., In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998). In Disney, the Chancery Court
stated,
The Plaintiffs in this action attempt to convert their flawed derivative claim
against Disney for paying Ovitz severance benefits to a disclosure claim. First,
they claim that the information was germane to shareholder consideration of the
five directors' re-election because shareholders would consider important within
the total mix the fact that these directors approved such extravagant waste. That
assertion runs afoul of the rule against self-flagellation:
Delaware law does not, however, require a proxy statement to impugn
a director's character or draw negative inferences from his past business
practices.
It only requires a summary of his credentials and his
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Our third category within the overall umbrella of good faith is "conduct
involving illegality," a "culpable" lack of diligence to prevent illegal acts,
such as was alleged in Stone itself and in Caremark, or actual commission
of illegal acts, the most notable example of which is perhaps Miller v.
AT&T. 82 Here, unlike in all the cases discussed above, a stark divergence
between directors' interests and those of shareholders is not in any obvious
way what is at issue. Illegal behavior may very well maximize corporate
profits; indeed, we would expect that it often would. Paying an illegal bribe
in country Z is intended to get you more business in country Z. Often, a
company's (non-U.S.) competitors are not subject to antibribery rules, and
if the U.S. executive follows the rules, he will lose business to the
competitor that can bribe without fear of legal sanction. In some cases, the
executive may have made a bad decision in deciding on the illegal
conduct-perhaps he underestimated the risk and cost of sanctions so that
the ex ante return on the illegal conduct was less than he thought it would
be or even negative. However, why should that not simply be treated as a
judgment call given business judgment rule protection, as most other non83
self-interested decisions are?
There are several reasons why we might want to treat illegal behavior
differently, with less legal deference. For one, the directors' willingness to
tolerate or engage in illegal conduct may be a proxy for their willingness to
engage in conduct that more directly diverges with the shareholders'
interests. Someone who sets out to break the law often displays stealth and
a willingness to pursue a more parochial interest over a competing more
general interest: their own personal interest over the interests of others, their
family or friends' interests over that of strangers, or their corporations'
interests over more general social welfare. 84 Those very traits also
characterize those prone to steal from their corporations. Also, we may
regard illegal acts as contrary to shareholders' interests notwithstanding that
they might be in shareholders' pecuniary interests. Shareholders are also
citizens, and insofar as laws advance the general social welfare, citizens
care about that. A diversified shareholder with small stakes in any one
corporation may well find that the public interest predominates over the
qualifications to serve on the board as well as a description of any
conflicts of interest. Nothing in our law requires a masochistic litany of
management minutiae.
Id. at 377 (quoting Wolf v. Assaf, No. C.A. 15339, 1998 WL 326662, at *5 (Del. Ch. June
16, 1998)). It is interesting to consider whether a good faith framework might be able to
revive some of these claims where the disclosure was drafted, as legal disclosures frequently
are, to convey the fact of what was done while somewhat obscuring the spirit.
82. 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
83. Stephen Bainbridge has made this point in criticizing Stone. Stephen M. Bainbridge

et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight 36-38 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law &
Economics Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-09, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract = 1006097.
84. Note that whether the corporation's interest is parochial or general depends on the
context and what it is being compared to: it is more general than one individual's interest but
more parochial than society's interests.
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corporate interest. The other possible account, rather less neat from a
doctrinal perspective, is that, because corporations are chartered by the
state, they owe a duty to the public, which may include the shareholders,
not to act illegally. 85 This reason moves us away from the agency account
that underlies the rest of this Essay and most current scholarly thinking
about corporate law. Since the second reason for caring about illegal action
provided above blends into this third reason, we do not need to draw too
86
fine a line as to which better explains why the law has developed as it has.
These reasons are probably enough to explain why directors acting in
deliberately illegal ways violate their duty of good faith. However, they do
not help us nearly as much in explaining why and when directors who fail
to monitor for illegal behavior are violating their duty of good faith. Our
best account is this: directors are shirking their responsibility to be vigilant
when they, on some metric, "ought" to know what their lack of vigilance
might permit; hence, the violation of the duty of good faith. This
description seems to fit the allegations made in Caremark and Stone, and
the standards for liability enunciated therein. The Disney Chancery Court
opinion in 2005 quoted Nagy v. Bistricer,87 as follows:
If it is useful at all as an independent concept, [good faith's] utility may
rest in its constant reminder ...that, regardless of his motive, a director
who consciously disregards his duties to the corporation and its
stockholders may suffer a personal judgment for monetary damages for
any harm he causes [even if for a reason] other than personal pecuniary
interest.

88

Perhaps another justification for the Caremark line of cases is that

internal control systems that monitor illegal behavior tend to overlap with
internal control systems that monitor fraudulent behavior. A board that
leaves its corporation open to subordinates breaking the law is also likely to
be vulnerable to top officers who choose to steal from the corporation.
J

85. A related reason could be that fiduciaries are classically supposed to be honest and
honorable,

and simply breaking

the law could be

seen as running afoul of that

characterization. See Frankel, supra note 55, at 129 ("Fiduciary law vests in entrustors the
legal right to rely on the honesty of their fiduciaries by imposing on fiduciaries a
corresponding duty of loyalty and other specific duties to deter dishonesty.").
86. There is one line of cases suggesting that damages from illegal conduct would only
be the amount by which the company suffered from the conduct net of what it gained. But
that damage formula is based on a New York decision that has subsequently been criticized.
See Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.18(c) cmt. e

(1994) ("In effect, derivative actions seeking to hold corporate officials accountable for fines
imposed on the corporation as a result of knowing criminal antitrust violations were
dismissed because the plaintiff could not prove that the crime did not pay. The continued
authority of these decisions is questionable after the New York Court of Appeals'
subsequent decision in Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494 (1969), which stressed that
the deterrent role of the derivative action excused the necessity of proving a loss to the
corporation and also held that an intangible loss to the corporation might arise from adverse
publicity and stigmatization.").
87. 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000).
88. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 754 n.453 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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Thus, there is at least a hint of structural bias and suspect motives present if
one considers, again, why the board might not have had appropriate
monitoring systems in place. These considerations combined with those in
the previous paragraph may be enough to justify somewhat more judicial
scrutiny than applies in duty of care cases. However, they do not seem to
justify much more scrutiny, and indeed that is precisely what we find.
Stone may have located Caremark on the loyalty side of the loyalty/care
divide, but it is very near the border with care. As we have already seen,
and emphasize more in the next part, not all cases on the loyalty side of the
divide are treated equally-not by a long shot. Some cases within the good
faith zone of loyalty receive weak judicial scrutiny, while others receive
much more searching scrutiny. Caremarkis very much on the weak end of
the continuum. Indeed, the categorization of a fact pattern as a Caremark
case is almost as good a piece of news for defendants as its categorization
as a care case would be: it is very hard for defendants to be held liable in a
Caremarkcase.
It seems, then, that the doctrine of good faith can help us articulate the
breach at issue for cases that fall in the middle of the care/loyalty
continuum that we have previously hypothesized.8 9 Its status as a
presumption has worked well at the care end of the continuum. In
principle, we do want to make sure that directors are working hard enough
and well enough, but we do not want to encourage constant ex post secondguessing of directors by the shareholders. 90 Where plaintiffs cannot
articulate anything other than a problematic decision made after what seems
to them like less-than-thorough process, good faith should indeed be
presumed, especially given the incentives plaintiffs have to bring suits
whenever a decision turns out badly whatever the merits at issue. While, as
we have noted, not working hard or well enough constitutes a taking of
leisure to which one is not entitled, and hence could be characterized as a
breach of the duty of loyalty, the situations are sufficiently distinct that a
different label-care rather than loyalty-seems appropriate, as does, of
course, a deferential doctrine, with its substantive backstop for truly
egregious decisions, namely, waste. But-and this is key-until recently,
many cases couched as care cases in fact implicated something else-not
loyalty as loyalty had traditionally been characterized, but something
culpable nevertheless, often because of structural bias or suspect motives.
Consider in this regard the following quote from the Disney Chancery Court
opinion in 2005:
It is precisely in this context-an imperial CEO or controlling shareholder
with a supine or passive board-that the concept of good faith may prove

89. Lyman Johnson also suggests that good faith can provide doctrinal support for the
duty to affirmatively devote oneself to the corporation's interest, something Johnson calls
the "affirmative" or "devotion" side of loyalty. See Johnson, supra note 58, at 69 n.245.
90. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 83 (2004).
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highly meaningful.
The fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, as
traditionally defined, may not be aggressive enough to protect shareholder
interests when the board is well advised, is not legally beholden to the
management or a controlling shareholder and when the board does not
suffer from other disabling conflicts of interest, such as a patently selfdealing transaction. Good faith may serve to fill this gap and ensure that
the persons entrusted by shareholdersto govern Delaware corporations do
so with an honesty of purpose and with an understanding of whose
interests they are there to protect.9 1
In addition to the other benefits discussed above, the good faith doctrine
also potentially allows us to expand and rationalize the class of intermediate
standards-now consisting principally of Unocal, regarding takeover
threats; Revlon, regarding corporations that have been put up for sale; and
Zapata, regarding decisions not to pursue a derivative suit 92-into a more
coherent framework.
We should address here two criticisms of this increased judicial use of
the good faith concept in corporate law. One criticism is that the scope of
good faith liability is uncertain, and will thus increase litigation and
litigation costs. 93 That is true, but we do not see it as a decisive objection.
The increase in uncertainty is limited by two factors. First, as we shall
argue in the next part, the courts have already articulated more fine-tuned
and precise standards of review for a variety of specific situations that
would be encompassed within the good faith framework, reducing
uncertainty in those situations. Second, the Disney definition of good faith
is of relatively limited scope and draws on intent language that is common
in many areas of law. It thus does not provide much comfort for plaintiffs
who want to go too far in expanding the scope of the law, and the long
history of similar language imports a fair amount of guidance for lawyers
interpreting the cases. Moreover, any sort of legal standard can be
criticized as yielding greater uncertainty and litigation costs than would a
precise rule. However, sometimes standards make sense as a way to give
courts flexibility to, respond to complicated fact patterns and new
circumstances. We argue in the next part that this is one of those times. All
this being said, we should be clear at this juncture that our conception of
good faith may very well go beyond that used by the Disney court. As we
discuss in the next part, the good faith cases closest to the care end of the
continuum may contemplate less intentionality than is suggested in the
Disney case. But the jurisprudence still likely will, and should, develop in a
sufficiently cautious and incremental manner that defendants should not
have to see their burdens in defending against derivative cases suddenly
increase appreciably.

91. Disney, 907 A.2d at 760 n.487.
92. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
93. See Bainbridge et al., supra note 83, at 34; see also Andrew S. Gold, A Decision
Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and
Judicial Uncertainty, 66 Md. L. Rev. 398 (2007).
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Stephen Bainbridge has raised another objection to Stone, based on the
remedy rule that results from the doctrinal placement of good faith. 94 He
argues that stripping away ill-gotten gains is the traditional remedy for
loyalty violations, but by extending the duty of loyalty to cases where the
defendants have not received any material pecuniary gain at the expense of
the corporation, this remedy will become unavailable. This will create "a
conceptually difficult task of crafting appropriate remedies" 95 and also
create a doctrinal conflict with Cede's holding that harm causation is not a
required element. 96 We are not convinced by this objection. Although it is
true that rescission or rescissionary damages are the standard form of
remedy in standard loyalty cases, the Delaware Supreme Court has already
held that in loyalty cases the court may "fashion any form of equitable and
monetary relief as may be appropriate." 97 Thus, rescissionary damages are
not the exclusive remedy available. Compensatory damages; may also be
used, as appropriate.
Indeed, in the general law of agency, both
compensatory damages and recovery of the value received wrongfully by
the principal are valid remedies. 9 8 Thus, if there is no ill-gotten gain in any
particular case, that simply means that one of several possible damage
measures is not available in that case. The other measures may still be
used.
We now turn to a discussion of our framework.
IV. OUR PROPOSAL

Stone v. Ritter forges a path to what we think is the right answer. The
terminology does not line up completely with ours, but we think
analytically the framework and result are the same.
Director duties, and breaches thereof, fall along a continuum. There are
stylized cases at both ends, where the procedures have been well developed.
Care, with its very strong deference, which essentially translates into
"plaintiff loses" (and even if he did not lose, there would be exculpation), is
at one extreme. Traditional loyalty, where the defendant has to show good
process (in the form of approval by disinterested and fully informed
directors, shareholders, or both) or, failing that, very good substance (that
is, "entire" or "intrinsic" fairness), is at the other extreme. Of most interest
here are the cases that fall between these extremes, where we think good
faith will increasingly become part of the doctrinal story.
In dividing up the cases along this continuum, we can think at varying
levels of abstraction (see Figure 1). At the very highest level, there is just
one fiduciary duty-to pursue faithfully and diligently the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders. Below this level of abstraction, we

94. Bainbridge et al., supra note 83, at 28-31.

95. Id. at 31.
96. Id. at 28-31.
97. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983).

98. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 407 (1957).
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can see the continuum of cases as divided into the two traditional
categories, care and loyalty. Why divide the cases this way? As we discuss
above and below, we put into the care category circumstances where we
want courts to largely avoid scrutinizing board behavior, such that it is
extremely unlikely that directors will ever be held personally liable. 99
Loyalty cases deserve at least a bit of (and sometimes quite a bit of) a closer
look from courts.
One level of abstraction below that, we divide the loyalty category into
two parts. One part, at the extreme end, is traditional loyalty cases, where
directors or officers have a pecuniary material interest that conflicts with
the interests of the corporation. The other part is good faith. This includes
the intermediate cases that fall between traditional care and traditional
loyalty. Why is this division of the broad loyalty category useful? Cases
presenting facts that fall in the traditional loyalty category clearly deserve
close scrutiny from some sort of independent decision maker, be it
independent directors, shareholders, or the courts.
We have wellestablished rules for these sorts of cases. Good faith is a more nebulous
category. It includes many different kinds of factual circumstances, united
by the fact that we have some reason to be concerned about director
objectivity (hence, they are not care cases), but the stark concerns of
traditional conflicts of interest are not present (hence, they are not
traditional loyalty cases). It is thus useful to distinguish good faith from
traditional loyalty.
If we then descend one more level of abstraction, we find that the good
faith region in turn subdivides at present into a variety of different factual
circumstances and related standards of review. The more specific standards
of review give structured guidance to courts, corporations, and their
counselors where the facts fall within the scope of those specific standards.
The general backdrop of good faith gives courts flexibility to deal with new
circumstances that do not fit within better defined standards of review, and
to develop new specific standards for other sorts of cases where
appropriate. 100

Let us look more closely at each part of this continuum. At one end is
generic inattentiveness: The directors did not give the attention that was
due, for no purposive or intentional reason. The directors are taking from
the corporation something that belongs to the corporation-their due
consideration and time. Still, given the ever-present concern that directors
might become too risk averse and too tied up in ex post shareholder secondguessing, and, given the broad grant of authority to the board, the present
regime seems appropriate in cases where nothing more can be shown.

99. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 90.
100. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 Del. J.

Corp. L. 1, 30-31 (2006).
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Consider in this regard Kamin v. American Express Co.'0 1 Kamin
involved a substantive decision to forego $8 million in tax savings in order
to avoid $25 million in accounting losses. 10 2 Tax savings are real monetary
savings; accounting losses or gains are merely paper losses or gains. A
robust debate exists as to whether markets value accounting earnings; the
best academic findings indicate that the answer is no, but market
10 3
practitioners typically say and apparently believe the answer is yes.
Indeed, there is considerable evidence that they "put their money where
their mouths are," paying considerable amounts (admittedly, of others'
money, but certainly, of their own time) to structure transactions to obtain
the more desirable accounting treatment. 10 4 The directors in Kamin
listened, in good faith, to the market practitioners, who told them the market
would react very badly to a $25 million loss and not nearly so badly to a
decision not to save $8 million in taxes. 10 5 This seems like precisely the
sort of decision directors should not be second-guessed6 on: good faith here
0
was appropriately presumed and, apparently, present.'
Another reason exists for favoring considerable deference in cases of
simple generic inattention. The main result of imposing liability would
probably not be more diligent decisions. Rather, it would probably be a full
employment act for lawyers and other advisers (and, as is commonly
observed, perhaps a smaller contingent of people willing to serve as
directors), as proper process was painstakingly documented. Telling
directors to work harder and better-and face liability if they do notscarcely seems to provide sensible incentives.
At the other end of the continuum is traditional loyalty, where one or
more directors, officers, or controlling shareholders has a material
pecuniary interest in a decision that conflicts with the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders in that decision. Here, a transaction
involving a conflict of interest is presumptively invalid, unless it is
validated through one of three methods. A defendant in a loyalty case must
show that (1) the transaction was approved by disinterested and
independent directors; (2) the transaction was approved by disinterested
7
shareholders; or (3) the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation. 10

101. 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (App. Div. 1976).
102. Id. at 809.
103. One of us wrote an article discussing this debate. See generally Claire A. Hill, Why
FinancialAppearances Might Matter: An Explanationfor 'Dirty Pooling' and Some Other
Types of FinancialCosmetics, 22 Del. J. Corp. L. 141 (1997).
104. Id. at 145-46 n. 12 (discussing the AT&T/NCR transaction).
105. Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811-12.
106. This being said, we should note that, in Hill & McDonnell, supra note 54, at 860
n.135, we argue that Kamin may not actually have been a straightforward care case. The
alternative explanation invokes structural bias, suspect motives, and/or even straightforward
self-interest: the directors were motivated by a compensation measure, applicable to the
compensation of four of the twenty-member board, based on accounting earnings rather than
the report by market experts as to the likely effect of the accounting loss.
107. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (2001).
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Any of these prongs involves a fair degree of scrutiny by the court of the
process by which a transaction was approved, and at least some scrutiny of
the substance of the transaction as well, albeit usually only minimal
substantive scrutiny in the first two prongs.
In between, there is a vast middle ground. In our earlier paper, we
located structural bias within a middle ground between traditional loyalty
and care. 10 8 We also discussed certain stylized types of cases in which
courts had adopted procedures that were intermediate, neither at the "pure
care" end nor at the "pure loyalty" end. Here, we propose that the middle
ground actually is lack of good faith. At one end of the middle ground
itself is simple lack of good faith; at the other is affirmative bad faith. 10 9
The best formulation to date for this middle ground is the analysis in the
Disney cases described above. 110 However, if some recurring set of
circumstances is important and unique enough, courts may elaborate the
general good faith analysis into a more specific doctrine for those
circumstances. Moreover, articulation of the broad contours of the doctrine
may very well change, especially as the role of differing levels of
intentionality becomes more developed in the jurisprudence. Thus, over
time the broad good faith part of the continuum becomes more complicated
and highly elaborated.
Figure 1, at the lowest level of abstraction, locates some of the key cases
within the good faith middle ground. Cases closer to the care end of the
continuum receive less scrutiny from courts; cases closer to the loyalty end
receive more scrutiny.
This continuum is not necessarily smooth
everywhere; there are notches and bumps. A big bump occurs at the
boundary between care and loyalty, where a notably higher degree of
judicial scrutiny kicks in. The placement of a case on this continuum
reflects the courts' rough judgment as to how much risk of biased decision
making is present within a given type of circumstance. The three categories
we considered in Part III all enter into this analysis. The more structural
bias that is present, the further toward the loyalty end a fact pattern will
tend to fall. Similarly, the more suspect motives appear to be present, the
further toward the loyalty end one will find a case. The subcategory of
other culpable conduct, conduct involving illegality, also moves a case
toward the loyalty end, much more so where the illegality reflects
intentional behavior by directors or officers. That being said, even a failure
to monitor as in Caremarkmoves the case toward the loyalty end-after all,
it moves the case from care to loyalty, given Stone. Weighed against these
factors is the need to allow corporations to choose freely whether or not to
enter into certain kinds of transactions. We do not claim the considerations
108. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 54, at 855.
109. On the distinction between lack of good faith and bad faith, see id. at 856-57. See
also Elizabeth A. Nowicki, The Unimportance of Being Earnest: Reflections on Director
Liability
and
Good
Faith
(Aug.
1, 2006)
(unpublished
manuscript),
availableat http://www.ssm.com/abstract=921668.
110. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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we have mentioned occupy the field completely; there may currently be
more, or there may come to be more. That said, let us consider the range of
cases within the good faith portion of the continuum.
On the left, closest to the duty of care, is Caremark,i.e., cases where the
board allegedly failed to put in place adequate systems to monitor illegal
behavior by subordinate employees.
As long as the board has put
something in place, courts are almost certain to defer to the board in such
cases, absent further suspicious facts."'I In Caremark cases there is just a
whiff of structural bias and suspect motives, and while there is illegal
behavior, it is by subordinates, not by the board or top officers; hence, there
is little reason for concern about biased decision making in such cases.
Moving a bit toward the loyalty end, we have placed Levine v. Smith." 12
Levine deals with judicial review of decisions by boards to reject a demand
made by plaintiffs prior to instituting a derivative action. Such cases
involve greater concern about structural bias and suspect motives, insofar as
directors are making a decision about whether a case against themselves
and/or their fellow directors should continue. Indeed, one might well argue
that this situation should be placed further toward the loyalty end of the
continuum than we have put it here. In this regard, some states' courts
impose a high level of scrutiny for such decisions because of the structural
bias concerns. 1 3 However, Delaware has chosen to extend business
judgment rule protection to such cases, although the board's decision can
still be scrutinized for good faith.' 14 In our earlier article, we suggest that
Delaware's review of such decisions can and should be stiffened somewhat
5
through the use of good faith analysis. 1
Moving again toward the loyalty end in Figure 1, but still relatively close
to the care end, we find Disney. Disney articulates a general standard for
good faith, but it also deals with a recurring and important fact pattern,
namely, executive compensation decisions. Executive compensation is
receiving a great deal of attention, and the Delaware courts are seeing more

11. Bainbridge voices concern about the consequences of Stone in instances where a
board has adopted no compliance system whatsoever. He believes it may inappropriately let
boards off where they are unaware of the duty to have such a system, and that it may
inappropriately find boards liable where they have carefully weighed the costs and benefits
and decided such a system is not worth it. Bainbridge et al., supra note 83, at 42-48. We
doubt that in this day and age any public corporation board can plausibly fit into the former,
uninformed category-the duty to have a compliance system is simply too pervasive,
particularly post-Sarbanes-Oxley. As for the latter category, a consequence of Stone is
indeed that any board will feel it must have some sort of legal compliance system in placeand that is presumably an intended effect, and one that is defensible, as we argued above.
See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text. Moreover, the need for intentional behavior
may be muted as the good faith doctrine develops; an additional ground for finding the
totally unaware board liable may therefore come to exist.
112. 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991).
113. See, e.g., Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 1987).
114. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996).
115. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 54, at 859.
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compensation cases.' 16 We expect that, as the courts see more such cases,
they will develop more specific guidance. This may take the form of
articulating a specific standard of review, but even if not, the courts through
accumulated cases will give more guidance as to what sorts of procedure
are likely to insulate compensation decisions, and what sorts of procedure
will raise red flags. Executive compensation implicates significant concern
about structural bias, which is why a fair degree of scrutiny is warranted.
On the other hand, compensation decisions are unavoidable, frequent, and
recurrent, so an overly strict standard of judicial scrutiny would be too
much of an intrusion into board decision making; hence, Disney remains
not far from the care end of the continuum.
Moving further along in Figure 1, we find the two main change of control
categories, Unocal and Revlon.I1 7 Changes in corporate control inherently
raise structural bias and suspect motive concerns, as directors and officers
want to protect their positions (and each others' positions) within the
corporation. This is why the Delaware courts give more scrutiny in such
cases than they would if they were using business judgment deference.
However, changes in corporate control and defenses against such changes
both have strong justifications in some circumstances. Courts are not very
good at distinguishing where control changes should be encouraged or
discouraged, and to whom control should be transferred if there is to be a
change. It is therefore inadvisable for courts to very closely scrutinize a
board's decision in these matters. The courts have tried to strike a balance
between these competing considerations, crafting standards of review that
put such cases in the middle of the continuum.
Getting close to the loyalty end, we find Zapata.1 8 Recall that Zapata
involves derivative suits where shareholder demand was excused, the board
set up a special litigation committee to review the merits of the suit, and the
committee recommended dismissal.' 19 Here, the structural bias concerns
are very strong, the ability of the court to judge the wisdom of the
committee's decision is better than usual, and the business needs to use
such committees are relatively weak. Hence, there is not much reason to
defer to such decisions, and Delaware courts do not.
Closest to the loyalty end of the continuum is Blasius Industries, Inc. v.
Atlas Corp.120 This case, as later described by the Chancery Court,
involves board actions taken with the intent of precluding shareholder
action: "[T]he incumbent board attempted to appoint new members at the
eleventh hour to preclude shareholders from filling those seats by electing a

116. See, e.g., Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Tyson Foods
Consol. Shareholder Litig., 919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341
(Del. Ch. 2007).
117. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
120. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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hostile acquirer's candidates."' 12 1 State of Wisconsin Investment Board v.
Peerless, a subsequent case applying Blasius, involved a board's
adjournment of a shareholder meeting when it became clear that a
shareholder vote would approve a measure that management opposed. 122
Once Blasius is invoked, the judicial scrutiny is no less searching than in
traditional loyalty cases themselves-perhaps even more searching. 12 3
We think this structure tracks fairly closely the Delaware case law on
fiduciary duty as it has developed. The structure is of course not perfect;
however, it does succeed in giving the courts flexibility to address new
situations as they arise while still providing corporations and their counsel a
fair degree of guidance in many kinds of recurring situations. It also does,
we think, a sensible job of singling out for greater judicial scrutiny those
kinds of cases that are likely to be more problematic.
Our structure and its conceptual underpinnings also serve another
important function. Extralegal forces-norms and reputation-play a very
strong role in the behavior of corporate actors. 124 Delaware courts are
clearly aware of this function, and employ it to encourage behavior they
find desirable but that would be difficult to address more directly through
law itself. 125 Consider in this regard much of the language in Caremark. In
approving the settlement in that case, Chancellor Allen expressly
acknowledged that the plaintiffs almost certainly would have lost. Still, he
took the occasion to articulate what directors ought to be doing in cases
presenting Caremark-type issues. Similarly, consider the language in the
Chancery Court opinion in Disney.126 The court takes pains to describe the
deficiencies in the board of directors' process, characterizing it as "fall[ing]
far short of what shareholders expect and demand from those entrusted with
a fiduciary position,"' 12 7 while nevertheless ruling in their favor. Finally,
consider also the case of Kahn v. Sullivan, 128 where the court approved a
settlement of an action against Occidental Petroleum for having built a
museum with corporate funds to house the art collection of the CEO and

121. State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. Civ. A. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376,
at *12 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000).

122. Id. at *1.
123. A recent case refines, and arguably somewhat alters, the Blasius standard. See
Mercier v. Inter-Tel., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007). Blasius seemed to suggest that it would
be very hard to postpone a shareholder vote to stop a result the management did not like;
Mercier suggests that such a postponement may be not quite so hard.
124. Johnson also stresses the interplay between the judicial loyalty rhetorical and
extrajudicial norms. See Johnson, supra note 58, at 29.
125. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware
Corporate Law and Governance From 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key
Developments, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1399, 1406 (2005) (describing "an important genre of
Delaware decision making" that "raises questions or teaches without imposing liability"
thereby providing "guidance to the corporate world to conform to best practices without the
downside of actually imposing personal liability").

126. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
127. Id. at 763.
128. 594 A.2d48 (Del. 1991).
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one percent shareholder. 129
Approving the settlement, the court
nevertheless noted its displeasure with the board:
[T]he Settlement in the Court's opinion leaves much to be desired.
The Court's role in reviewing the proposed Settlement, however, is
quite restricted. If the Court was a stockholder of Occidental it might
vote for new directors, if it was on the Board it might vote for new
management and if it was a member of the Special Committee it might
vote against the Museum project. But its options are limited .... 130
The court is telling corporate actors how it thinks they should behaveand corporate actors listen. Consider in this regard the rush to abide by
"Caremark duties" after the case was decided. Corporations employ wellpaid advisers to tell them how to avoid conduct that might trigger liability.
Activist shareholders publicize their corporations' deviations from what the
activists view as best practices, and bring shareholder resolutions to
advance their views. Indeed, as jurisprudence on good faith develops, we
would expect norms of conduct to develop as well, which will almost
certainly contain a penumbra beyond what law can directly reach.
CONCLUSION

In the classic formulation of the duty of loyalty, when a director breaches
her duty of loyalty, she takes for herself or her relations or affiliates what
should otherwise be the corporation's. Classic duty of loyalty cases
paradigmatically involve a conveyance of money or assets between the
director or officer and the corporation. It is clear, given that the director or
officer can have a role in setting the terms of the conveyance, that the terms
could be biased in favor of the director or officer. Thus, once there is such
a conveyance, the terms are necessarily scrutinized, as is the process by
which the terms were reached.
Classic duty of care cases also involve a director taking for herself
something which should otherwise be the corporation's: her attention and
diligence. But clearly, we cannot apply the same level of scrutiny to all
corporate decisions as we are willing to apply to decisions where the
director or officer had a clear opportunity to benefit herself at the expense
of the corporation. Thus, the duty of care jurisprudence has developed with
considerable deference to directors and officers.
The difficulty has been, though, that, as a general matter, if a case did not
fall under the narrow loyalty definition, it too often was treated as invoking
only the duty of care-notwithstanding some indication that the directors
were not properly doing their jobs, and that the omission was not simple
neglect. Consider why directors might not have given adequate attention to

129. Id. at 51-52.
130. Id. at 58 n.23 (citing Sullivan v. Hammer, CIV. A. No. 10823, 1990 WL 114223, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1990), aff'd sub nom, Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48).
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a decision. In many, and perhaps most, cases, inadequate attention will
mean something in the family of rubber stamping on account of structural
bias, something that does essentially implicate loyalty concerns.
Thus, we have had a class of cases in which the directors are somehow
culpable-but how were we to characterize that culpability in the context of
existing fiduciary duty jurisprudence? The issue always mattered, but came
to matter even more after the enactment of section 102(b)(7). Before,
liability for breach of duty of care was simply exceedingly unlikely. After
section 102(b)(7), it became impossible. Something clearly needed to
occur-a recognition and delineation of a middle-ground category of
culpable act or omission, as has now occurred in Stone v. Ritter.
That middle ground is the realm of good faith. Cases that fall into this
realm will get greater judicial scrutiny than care cases, and create some risk
of liability. How much more scrutiny and risk will depend on how much
risk of director misbehavior is present in a particular kind of context. For
frequently recurring contexts-takeover defenses, derivative actions,
executive compensation, and so on-the courts will continue to develop
more specialized rules that respond to the challenges arising within each
context. Beyond that, the courts will, and should, continue to use good faith
to address new sorts of corporate governance issues that arise with evolving
business practices that raise questions of structural bias, suspect motivation,
or other sorts of concerns. Courts should continue as well to use their
"bully pulpit" to set forth and encourage the development of norms and best
practices that may effectively influence directors as much as, or more than,
the fear of legal liability.

Figure 1:
A Continuum of Cases

